On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
This paper characterizes mechanisms satisfying incentive compatibility and individual rationality in the classical public good provision problem. Many papers in the literature obtain the results in the so-called standard model of ex ante identical agents with a continuous, closed interval of types....
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| المؤلفون الرئيسيون: | , |
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| التنسيق: | text |
| اللغة: | English |
| منشور في: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2021
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| الموضوعات: | |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2540 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3539/viewcontent/public_good_Mar_06_2021.pdf |
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