Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: ARTEMOV, Georgy, KUNIMOTO, Takashi, SERRANO, Roberto
• التنسيق: text
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2013
• الموضوعات: Wilson doctrine; Mechanism; design; Robust virtual implementation; Δ-rationalizability; Incentive compatibility; Measurability; Type diversity; Economic Theory
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2002; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3001/viewcontent/RobustVirtualImplementation_2012_JET.pdf
• المؤسسة: Singapore Management University

We study a mechanism design problem where arbitrary restrictions are placed on the sets of first-order beliefs of agents. Calling these restrictions Δ, we use Δ-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003, [5]) as our solution concept, and require that a mechanism virtually implement a socia...