Toward general robustness evaluation of incentive mechanism against bounded rationality
An incentive mechanism is designed to achieve desired outcomes as Nash equilibrium, by assuming agents to be fully rational. Nevertheless, practical agents may violate this assumption for various reasons, causing mechanisms to fail. Thus, before deploying a mechanism in practice, it is crucial to qu...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| 格式: | Article |
| 語言: | English |
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2020
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| 在線閱讀: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/140632 |
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