The influences of director interlocks with public firms and presence of government holdings on IPO performances.

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: Seah, Esmond Cheng Xin., Wong, Mabel Mei Ying., Yeo, Yuan Lun.
• مؤلفون آخرون: Nanyang Business School
• التنسيق: Final Year Project
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: 2011
• الموضوعات: DRNTU::Business::Finance::Equity
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: http://hdl.handle.net/10356/43659
• المؤسسة: Nanyang Technological University

This study draws upon theories of board affiliations to examine the relationship between director interlocks and IPO performance of Singaporean firms. Specifically, we study how the quality of interlocks and government holdings influences the IPO performance of firms. Empirical tests were conducted on over 190 public firms listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX) between the years 1994 and 2004. The results show that firms with director interlocks with public firms (listed on SGX) improve IPO performance, but not for interlocks with non public firms. In addition, firms with government holdings performed better than firms without government holdings.