Signaling in Online Credit Markets
We study how signaling affects equilibrium outcomes and welfare in markets with adverse selection. Using data from an online credit market, we estimate a model of borrowers and lenders where low reserve interest rates can signal low default risk. Comparing a market with and without signaling relativ...
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語言: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2015
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在線閱讀: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1733 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2732/viewcontent/Signaling_in_Online_Credit_Markets_wp.pdf |
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機構: | Singapore Management University |
語言: | English |