Conflict with Quitting Rights: A Mechanism Design Approach
Why do agents engage in costly dispute resolution such as litigation and arbitration when costless settlement is available? I present a model with one sided asymmetric information where the payoff from litigation for both agents depends on the beliefs of the uninformed agent. Taking these payoffs as...
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| 格式: | text |
| 語言: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2012
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| 在線閱讀: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1385 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2384/viewcontent/18_2012_ConflictwithQuittingRightsAMechanismDesignApproach.pdf |
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