Conflict with Quitting Rights: A Mechanism Design Approach
Why do agents engage in costly dispute resolution such as litigation and arbitration when costless settlement is available? I present a model with one sided asymmetric information where the payoff from litigation for both agents depends on the beliefs of the uninformed agent. Taking these payoffs as...
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2012
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sg-smu-ink.soe_research-23842019-04-19T13:50:05Z Conflict with Quitting Rights: A Mechanism Design Approach ANEY, Madhav S. Why do agents engage in costly dispute resolution such as litigation and arbitration when costless settlement is available? I present a model with one sided asymmetric information where the payoff from litigation for both agents depends on the beliefs of the uninformed agent. Taking these payoffs as their outside options, agents negotiate over the allocation of an indivisible object that is in dispute and transfers. It is shown that it is impossible to implement an allocation that satisfies budget balance that guarantees the agents their payoff from conflict when agents can quit negotiations unilaterally at any stage. 2012-04-01T07:00:00Z text application/pdf https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1385 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2384/viewcontent/18_2012_ConflictwithQuittingRightsAMechanismDesignApproach.pdf http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ Research Collection School Of Economics eng Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University Labor Economics |
| institution |
Singapore Management University |
| building |
SMU Libraries |
| continent |
Asia |
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Singapore Singapore |
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SMU Libraries |
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InK@SMU |
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English |
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Labor Economics |
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Labor Economics ANEY, Madhav S. Conflict with Quitting Rights: A Mechanism Design Approach |
| description |
Why do agents engage in costly dispute resolution such as litigation and arbitration when costless settlement is available? I present a model with one sided asymmetric information where the payoff from litigation for both agents depends on the beliefs of the uninformed agent. Taking these payoffs as their outside options, agents negotiate over the allocation of an indivisible object that is in dispute and transfers. It is shown that it is impossible to implement an allocation that satisfies budget balance that guarantees the agents their payoff from conflict when agents can quit negotiations unilaterally at any stage. |
| format |
text |
| author |
ANEY, Madhav S. |
| author_facet |
ANEY, Madhav S. |
| author_sort |
ANEY, Madhav S. |
| title |
Conflict with Quitting Rights: A Mechanism Design Approach |
| title_short |
Conflict with Quitting Rights: A Mechanism Design Approach |
| title_full |
Conflict with Quitting Rights: A Mechanism Design Approach |
| title_fullStr |
Conflict with Quitting Rights: A Mechanism Design Approach |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Conflict with Quitting Rights: A Mechanism Design Approach |
| title_sort |
conflict with quitting rights: a mechanism design approach |
| publisher |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1385 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2384/viewcontent/18_2012_ConflictwithQuittingRightsAMechanismDesignApproach.pdf |
| _version_ |
1770571232198000640 |