On Domains that Admit Well-Behaved Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: CHATTERJI, Shurojit, SANVER, Remzi, SEN, Arunava
• التنسيق: text
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2010
• الموضوعات: Strategy-proofness; Restricted domains; Semi-single-peaked domains; Economic Theory
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1229; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2228/viewcontent/semispmay10.pdf
• المؤسسة: Singapore Management University

In this paper, we investigate domains that admit “well-behaved” strategy-proof social choice functions. We show that if the number of voters is even, then every domain that satisfies a richness condition and admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function, must be...