On Domains that Admit Well-Behaved Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions
In this paper, we investigate domains that admit “well-behaved” strategy-proof social choice functions. We show that if the number of voters is even, then every domain that satisfies a richness condition and admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function, must be...
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Main Authors: | , , |
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格式: | text |
語言: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2010
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在線閱讀: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1229 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2228/viewcontent/semispmay10.pdf |
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機構: | Singapore Management University |
語言: | English |