On Domains that Admit Well-Behaved Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions

In this paper, we investigate domains that admit “well-behaved” strategy-proof social choice functions. We show that if the number of voters is even, then every domain that satisfies a richness condition and admits an anonymous, tops-only, unanimous and strategy-proof social choice function, must be...

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Main Authors: CHATTERJI, Shurojit, SANVER, Remzi, SEN, Arunava
格式: text
語言:English
出版: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2010
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在線閱讀:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1229
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2228/viewcontent/semispmay10.pdf
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機構: Singapore Management University
語言: English