A defence of children's capacity for epistemic autonomy and responsibility
In this thesis, I defend the claim that children have sufficient capacities to be ascribed epistemic autonomy and consequently epistemic responsibility. To do so, I define epistemic autonomy as reflective endorsement and refer to empirical research to show that children have the capacity for it. Co...
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| 主要作者: | |
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| 格式: | Final Year Project |
| 語言: | English |
| 出版: |
Nanyang Technological University
2025
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| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/183208 |
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| 總結: | In this thesis, I defend the claim that children have sufficient capacities to be ascribed
epistemic autonomy and consequently epistemic responsibility. To do so, I define epistemic autonomy as reflective endorsement and refer to empirical research to show that children have the capacity for it. Consequently, children can be held epistemically responsible. That is, they are appropriate targets for epistemic appraisal. This is because they reflectively endorse their belief and fulfil the reasons-responsive condition necessary for epistemic appraisal. I consider the objection that children's capacity for reflective endorsement fails to meet the threshold necessary to be epistemic agents. This is because children's cognitive immaturity significantly narrows down their ability to respond to reasons. Hence, children are inappropriate candidates for epistemic blame. We might nevertheless blame them in a kind of make-believe way to prepare them to be epistemically appraised once they get the requisite capacities. In response, I argue that the objection fails to account for the full picture of epistemic appraisal regarding children. Namely, the objection fails to account for the fact that we often epistemically praise children when they form the right belief. Moreover, I argue that it is not a mistake for cognitive immaturity does not render children inappropriate candidates for epistemic praise. |
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