Is it morally wrong to engage in violent sexual kinks and fetishes?
In recent years, BDSM (Bondage and Discipline, Dominance and Submission, Sadism and Masochism), has raised moral concerns regarding informed consent in violent sexual practices. This paper explores the moral permissibility of engaging these kinks, particularly when the line between consensual and no...
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Nanyang Technological University
2025
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sg-ntu-dr.10356-1831762025-03-29T17:00:09Z Is it morally wrong to engage in violent sexual kinks and fetishes? Mansul, Misyal Sonnia Christophe de Ray School of Humanities christophe.deray@ntu.edu.sg Arts and Humanities Philosophy of sex Moral philosophy Ethics and public policy In recent years, BDSM (Bondage and Discipline, Dominance and Submission, Sadism and Masochism), has raised moral concerns regarding informed consent in violent sexual practices. This paper explores the moral permissibility of engaging these kinks, particularly when the line between consensual and non-consensual harm is unclear. With that understanding, I argue that such practices are morally permissible insofar as informed consent is present and that in there being a mutual understanding between the parties involved, the harm incurred leads to a net overall benefit. In the first half, I outline Kant’s view on objectification and Martha Nussbaum’s defense of sexual objectification, arguing that certain forms of objectification can be morally permissible. Next, I address the problematic nature of inflicting harm, which is often assumed as undesirable. In the second half of the paper, I defend my position by explicating the benefits of harm and how the consensual nature of these acts does not strip individuals of their autonomy. Lastly, I reference L.A Paul’s theory of transformative experience to illustrate that, despite the epistemic limitations posed by transformative experiences i.e. BDSM acts, their informed consent still holds. Consequently, I conclude that these acts are morally permissible insofar as it is understood within the broader context of autonomy and ethical sexual practices. Bachelor's degree 2025-03-28T08:25:19Z 2025-03-28T08:25:19Z 2025 Final Year Project (FYP) Mansul, M. S. (2025). Is it morally wrong to engage in violent sexual kinks and fetishes?. Final Year Project (FYP), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/183176 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/183176 en application/pdf Nanyang Technological University |
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Nanyang Technological University |
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NTU Library |
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Asia |
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Singapore Singapore |
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NTU Library |
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Arts and Humanities Philosophy of sex Moral philosophy Ethics and public policy |
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Arts and Humanities Philosophy of sex Moral philosophy Ethics and public policy Mansul, Misyal Sonnia Is it morally wrong to engage in violent sexual kinks and fetishes? |
description |
In recent years, BDSM (Bondage and Discipline, Dominance and Submission, Sadism and Masochism), has raised moral concerns regarding informed consent in violent sexual practices. This paper explores the moral permissibility of engaging these kinks, particularly when the line between consensual and non-consensual harm is unclear. With that understanding, I argue that such practices are morally permissible insofar as informed consent is present and that in there being a mutual understanding between the parties involved, the harm incurred leads to a net overall benefit. In the first half, I outline Kant’s view on objectification and Martha Nussbaum’s defense of sexual objectification, arguing that certain forms of objectification can be morally permissible. Next, I address the problematic nature of inflicting harm, which is often assumed as undesirable. In the second half of the paper, I defend my position by explicating the benefits of harm and how the consensual nature of these acts does not strip individuals of their autonomy. Lastly, I reference L.A Paul’s theory of transformative experience to illustrate that, despite the epistemic limitations posed by transformative experiences i.e. BDSM acts, their informed consent still holds. Consequently, I conclude that these acts are morally permissible insofar as it is understood within the broader context of autonomy and ethical sexual practices. |
author2 |
Christophe de Ray |
author_facet |
Christophe de Ray Mansul, Misyal Sonnia |
format |
Final Year Project |
author |
Mansul, Misyal Sonnia |
author_sort |
Mansul, Misyal Sonnia |
title |
Is it morally wrong to engage in violent sexual kinks and fetishes? |
title_short |
Is it morally wrong to engage in violent sexual kinks and fetishes? |
title_full |
Is it morally wrong to engage in violent sexual kinks and fetishes? |
title_fullStr |
Is it morally wrong to engage in violent sexual kinks and fetishes? |
title_full_unstemmed |
Is it morally wrong to engage in violent sexual kinks and fetishes? |
title_sort |
is it morally wrong to engage in violent sexual kinks and fetishes? |
publisher |
Nanyang Technological University |
publishDate |
2025 |
url |
https://hdl.handle.net/10356/183176 |
_version_ |
1829245401396412416 |