Competitive disclosure of correlated information

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: Au, Pak Hung, Kawai, Keiichi
• مؤلفون آخرون: School of Social Sciences
• التنسيق: مقال
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: 2022
• الموضوعات: Social sciences::Economic theory; Bayesian Persuasion; Multiple Senders
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/160704
• المؤسسة: Nanyang Technological University

We analyze a model of competition in Bayesian persuasion in which two senders vie for the patronage of a receiver by disclosing information about the qualities of their respective proposals, which are positively correlated. The information externality—the news disclosed by one sender contains inform...