The argument from variation against using one’s own intuitions as evidence
In philosophical methodology, intuitions are used as evidence to support philosophical theories. In this paper, I evaluate the skeptical argument that variation in intuitions is good evidence that our intuitions are unreliable, and so we should be skeptical about our theories. I argue that the skept...
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| 格式: | Article |
| 語言: | English |
| 出版: |
2020
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| 在線閱讀: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/142335 |
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