The interplay of interdependence and correlation in bilateral trade

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: KUNIMOTO, Takashi, ZHANG, Cuiling
• التنسيق: text
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2024
• الموضوعات: auction theory; incentive compatible; individually rational mechanism; finite type space; correlated beliefs; interdependent valuations; bilateral trades; ex-post efficiency; budget balance; linear valuation; Economic Theory
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2736; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3735/viewcontent/interdependence_and_correlation_March_30_2024.pdf

Crémer and McLean (1988) show that the seller can extract full surplus almost always by an incentive compatible, individually rational mechanism in a single-unit auction model with a finite type space in which agents' beliefs are correlated and their valuations can be interdependent. We first s...