On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
This paper characterizes mechanisms satisfying Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) and interim individual rationality (IIR) in the classical public good provision problem. Many papers in the literature obtain the results in the so-called standard model of ex ante identical agents with a continuou...
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格式: | text |
語言: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2018
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在線閱讀: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2212 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3211/viewcontent/public_good_Nov_18_2018_.pdf |
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機構: | Singapore Management University |
語言: | English |